



NYU

SCHOOL OF  
PROFESSIONAL STUDIES

## SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW M.S. in Global Affairs

### General Course Information:

Instructor: Dr. Mary Beth Altier

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Course Number: GLOB1-GC3055

3 credits

Fall 2016

Wednesdays, 3:30-6:10 p.m., room TBA

Office Hours: By appointment & Mondays 3:30-5:30 pm

### Course Description:

A considerable gulf between theory and practice exists in international relations. This is particularly evident in international security, where actors frequently undertake their work isolated and insulated from relevant scholarly writings, while scholars seldom consider the day-to-day practices that constitute the work of such security professionals. Too often this separation leads to a respective loss in imagination and relevance. This course short-circuits the theory-practice divide by interlacing highly practical questions—such as, “How do you design and engineer a Demobilization, Demilitarization, and Reintegration program?”—with theoretical ones—“What is the legitimating function of local ownership?”

Security, in its many and varied aspects, is a basic good, but one that can apparently only be properly conveyed through a strict adherence to legal norms as well as the consent of the subjects and objects of it. We need law and cooperation for security. These theoretical claims are ineluctably drawn up and implicated in how the international community goes about its daily business. How can the international community aid states in their transition from the “rule of the gun” to the “rule of law”? How can the international community aid fragile and failing states in the provision of security while fostering long-term development of the rule of law and security sector reform? What challenges do developed democracies face in implementing the rule of law and what lessons about security sector reform can we learn from these cases that may apply to fragile or failing states? This class will examine why certain policies have failed to promote durable peace or create accountable security forces and others have been more successful. It will investigate the role of the armed forces and police in different societies, the capacities of international actors to change those roles and ways in which societies can respond to security threats. It will look at how the security sector can be controlled in a democratic society and how transitional countries can manage this process. In addition to theoretical readings, the course will draw on examples and experiences from around the world including case studies of Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, & Iraq.

This course follows a deductive pedagogy, moving from the general to the particular. It approaches the issue of contemporary security sector governance through a broad theoretical and historical literature. The first four classes establish a general baseline of primary sources and critical perspectives on security, development, fragility, and drivers of instability. The next six classes begin to drill down into the particulars of present stabilization, reconstruction, and rule of law programs. What do these programs seek to achieve? Who are key actors and stakeholders in modern security sector governance programs? What are some of the challenges these programs face and potential ways forward? The next three classes of this course cover in-depth case studies of security sector governance. The ultimate class returns to larger questions by exploring which programs and policies worked in what contexts and why.

### **Course Structure/Method:**

This course meets in-person for 2 hour and 40 minute sessions for 14 weeks. Please note this class does not meet on Wednesday, November 23<sup>rd</sup> and we need to reschedule the November 9<sup>th</sup> class as I will be out of town at a conference. The course relies on a combination of lectures as well as in-class group work, discussion, and debate. Students are expected to come prepared to discuss the assigned reading and to apply what they have gathered from that reading, lecture, and a close watching of international news to historical, emerging, or hypothetical scenarios.

### **Course Learning Outcomes:**

By the end of the course, students should be able to:

1. Define security, security sector governance, and the rule of law in international, national, and sub-national environments;
2. Understand and describe the relationship between peace-building and security sector governance;
3. Understand the historic genealogy and tools of international security assistance efforts;
4. Analyze contemporary practical efforts to achieve international and domestic security through security sector governance reform initiatives including SSR and DDR programs;
5. Understand the central theoretical debates and contested concepts bearing on these efforts;
6. Identify the principal legal issues and normative arguments surrounding contemporary security sector governance;
7. Amass in-depth knowledge of recent case studies;
8. Think creatively and intelligently about the design of peace-building initiatives, incorporating contemporary best practices in respect of program design, monitoring and evaluation.

### **Communication Policy:**

Students are strongly encouraged to come to me with any questions or concerns about this course or their program of study at CGA. I am always available by email or we can arrange a mutually convenient time to chat in-person, by phone, or via Skype. Students who are experiencing academic or personal issues that influence their performance in the course should see me as soon as possible. It is much easier to address extenuating circumstances before an assignment is due than after the fact.

### **Course Expectations:**

In order to pass this course, students must complete all assignments (see assessment section for description, due dates, and penalties for late assignments) and receiving a passing grade. Per SPS guidelines, students are not allowed to miss more than 2 sessions of the course (other than for verifiable medical or extenuating circumstances).

### **Required and Recommended Materials:**

The following book is required for this class and is available electronically via the NYU library here: <https://getit.library.nyu.edu/go/9404824>

However, I **cannot guarantee it will be available for the whole semester via the NYU library as their electronic holdings sometimes change** so it is also available via the NYU bookstore or other Internet sites.

- Marten, K. (2012) *Warlords: Strong-arm brokers in weak states*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (\$22.91 for paperback edition on Amazon)

All other required readings are available via the NYU library or the Internet and will be posted on NYU Classes under the “Resources” tab or hyperlinked on the syllabus. Recommended readings should be available via a search of the NYU library’s book or journal collection.

### **Pre-Course Reading Assignments (for Session 1):**

1. Rothschild, Emma. “What is Security?” *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (1995): 53-90.
2. Dillon, Michael. *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*. London: Routledge, 1996: 120-128.
3. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998: 21-48.
4. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. (2009) *Security Sector Governance and Reform*.
5. White House. Fact Sheet: US Security Assistance Policy: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>
6. UN Secretary General (2013) *Second Secretary-General's Report on SSR (A/67/970–S/2013/480)*.
7. UN High Commissioner, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, *Human suffering, moral blankness, and the ties of sentiment*. Speech presented to the Carnegie Council on 8 June 2015.

### **Web Resources:**

[Security Sector Reform Resource Center](#)  
[Security Governance Group](#)  
[Clingendael Institute](#)  
[Department for International Development](#)  
[FCO Conflict Prevention Pools](#)  
[GRSDRC](#)  
[Human Rights Watch](#)  
[Human Security Gateway](#)  
[International Crisis Group](#)

[Security Sector Reform Monitor](#)  
[Stimson Center](#)  
[United Nations Development Programme](#)  
[United States Institute of Peace](#)  
[World Bank – Development Indicators](#)  
[World Bank – Millennium Development Goals](#)

**Assessment and Assignments:**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Percentage of Overall Grade</b>
Class Participation	15%
Position Papers (5)	35%
Policy Memo & Presentation	35%
Case Study Briefing & Fact Sheet	15%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Class Participation (15%)**

Students are expected to attend and actively participate in all class sessions. In addition to being present, **participation entails being on time, staying focused, and taking an active role in class discussions and activities that demonstrates knowledge of the assigned readings and current events related to the course.** To that end, it is important to have prepared by completing the required readings before class so that you will be able to contribute to class discussion. Students are also encouraged to become familiar with the current discourse on security sector governance and rule of law issues in the media etc. Your participation grade will be determined by your attendance and active engagement in class discussion and activities as well as whether your participation demonstrates *meaningful knowledge* of the assigned readings and current topics in security sector governance and the rule of law. If you are nervous about speaking in class, please feel free to see me to discuss the issue.

Please make sure your cell phones (and anything else that beeps, rings, vibrates, or makes noise) are turned off during class.

**Position Papers (35%)**

Students are required to submit 5 “position papers” over the course of the term and **all students are required to submit a position paper either the second or third week of the course and 3 papers by Session 8.** Students may otherwise submit papers any weeks they choose, but only one per week. These papers are due Wednesday at noon beginning Wednesday September 14<sup>th</sup>. Their expected length is 250-500 words and they should provide a thoughtful critique of an argument presented in one or more of the required readings for the *following* class (e.g. if submitted on Wednesday, September 14<sup>th</sup>, the paper should cover the readings we will discuss that day in class). **Although knowledge of the readings is necessary, these papers should not summarize the reading(s), but should make a well-reasoned and well-supported argument.** Students are strongly encouraged to draw on their knowledge of real word cases/evidence or outside reading to

support their critique (which may be favorable or unfavorable). Students are permitted to submit 1 extra position paper (for a total of 6) and I will count your 5 highest grades.

Although you may submit these papers any 5 weeks you choose, I strongly encourage you to write them early on in the semester so that you can focus on your final paper and presentation towards the end of the semester. Also note that there is no assigned reading the final week of class requiring that students complete all 5 papers by Session 13.

**Papers will absolutely not be accepted following or during the class in which the readings are due and discussed.**

**Policy Memo, Presentation, & Proposal (35%):**

Students are required to write a 1500-2000 word policy memo (excluding references) on a security sector governance problem in a particular country or region. Students should identify the security sector governance problem, its potential causes, any efforts to remedy the problem and their effectiveness, and potential policy remedies. Students may also choose to focus on a particular security sector issue (e.g., border security, small arms proliferation, radicalization, ethnic or gender composition of the military/police, the design of DDR programs, gender and SSR, coups) without a country or regional focus though I would caution that the topic be narrow enough to cover well in 1500 words.

**This memo is due on Wednesday, December 14<sup>th</sup> at class time (3:30 pm).**

Students are expected to draw on the knowledge that they have accumulated about SSG over the course of the semester as well as *significant independent research* on the topic they choose. Even though this assignment is short in terms of word length, **students are expected to conduct the same amount of research as they would for a longer research paper and condense that information down into the most relevant points for policymakers and practitioners with only general knowledge of the case/issue through the appropriate use of citations and editing.** The memo is expected to be professional and reflective of the kind of assignment you would need to turn in if working for, for example, the UN or the US government. Memos that are poorly written, organized, or researched will not receive passing grades.

In order to ensure that students are on-track and working on their policy memos early on, you will be expected to submit a 1-2 page ungraded proposal highlighting the security sector governance issue you will investigate and potential sources (**due October 12<sup>th</sup>**).

Students will then prepare a 5-7 minute presentation for our final class on December 14<sup>th</sup> on the results of the research and analysis they conducted for their memo with time for Q & A. These presentations should be conducted as if one were addressing policymakers or practitioners on a critical issue in a limited amount of time. Remember, these are busy people so you need to convey the important issues and facts as well as policy recommendations as quickly and clearly as possible. **You should practice to ensure that the key points are covered in the allotted time.**

Your policy memo topic must differ significantly from your assigned case study briefing.

### **Case Study Briefing & Fact Sheet (15%):**

Students will brief the class on a case of security sector reform (SSR) and/or disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) that is not covered in-depth in the course readings. As there is still little consensus in the scholarly literature, the analysis of these additional cases is to help us further identify as a class best practices & lessons learned within particular contexts as well as gain substantive knowledge on a range of cases of SSR/DDR. A list of potential cases will be posted to the NYU Classes website, but others are possible.

Presentations should be 5-10 minutes in length and dates/cases will be selected during the first week of classes. For the presentation, students should provide some background into the case (i.e. why the need for SSR/DDR), an overview of the policies that were implemented and why, and then an assessment of how effective those changes have been and what policies may have been more effective, if appropriate (with attention to whether or not these changes are/would have been feasible). The briefing should be presented as if one were speaking to policymakers or practitioners who need the most important and accurate details quickly. Students should be professional, engaging, concise, and accurate in their presentation and may choose to make use of visuals. Students also must prepare and circulate a 1-2 page fact sheet to the class on their case that will be graded on content as well as style.

**Note:** Your position papers and research proposal may be single spaced, but your final memo should be double-spaced. All written assignments should have standard margins and font (11-12pt). Students are free to use any method of in-text citation or footnotes that they choose so long as all sources are properly referenced and the citation method selected is consistent throughout the assignment. **Unexcused late assignments will be penalized one full letter grade for every 24 hours that they are overdue. Students are expected to use proper grammar and think seriously about the organization and style of their writing. You will be penalized for sloppy, incoherent, or poorly organized writing.**

Midterm grades will be determined by your performance on your position papers and class participation to date.

All written work must be submitted via the [Assignment Tool](#) on NYU Classes. All required assignments in this course will be scanned by Turnitin plagiarism-detection software.

**Plagiarism** is presenting someone else's work as though it were one's own. More specifically, plagiarism is to present as one's own a sequence of words quoted without quotation marks from another writer; a paraphrased passage from another writer's work; creative images, artwork, or design; or facts or ideas gathered, organized, and reported by someone else, orally and/or in writing and not providing proper attribution. Since **plagiarism is a matter of fact, not of the student's intention**, it is crucial that acknowledgement of the sources be accurate and complete. Even where there is no conscious intention to deceive, the failure to make appropriate acknowledgment constitutes plagiarism. **Penalties for plagiarism range from automatic failure for a paper or course to dismissal from the University.**

## SPS Grading Policy:

Grade	Meaning	GPA Conversion
A	Exceptional; superior effort	4.0
A-	Excellent	3.7
B+	Very good	3.3
B	Good; meets program standards	3.0
B-	Meets program standards in most respects	2.7
C+	Requires moderate improvement	2.3
C	Requires significant improvement	2.0
C-	Requires extensive improvement	1.7
F	Fail – Did not meet minimal course requirements	0

## Writing Assistance

Some students may find they need improvement writing academic papers in a clear and concise manner. Because writing is one of the most important skills for a professional in Global Affairs, we highly recommend that any students experiencing difficulties with writing seek assistance in this area. One free, on-campus resource is the NYU Writing Center, located at 411 Lafayette St., 3rd Floor, Telephone: 212 998-8866 Email: [writingcenter@nyu.edu](mailto:writingcenter@nyu.edu). Additional resources are also available for international students through SPS at: <http://www.scps.nyu.edu/student-affairs/student-life/international/international-student-support-center/academic-enhancement-programs/tutoring.html>

## NYU SPS Policies:

“NYUSPS policies regarding the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Academic Integrity and Plagiarism, Students with Disabilities Statement, and Standards of Classroom Behavior among others can be found on the NYU Classes Academic Policies tab for all course sites as well as on the University and NYUSPS websites. Every student is responsible for reading, understanding, and complying with all of these policies.”

The full list of policies can be found at the web links below:

- University: <http://www.nyu.edu/about/policies-guidelines-compliance.html>
- NYUSPS: <http://sps.nyu.edu/academics/academic-policies-and-procedures.html>

## Additional Policies

- **Attendance and Lateness policy:** All students must attend class regularly. Your contribution to classroom learning is essential to the success of the course. Any more than two (2) absences (other than for verifiable medical or similar reasons) during the Fall and Spring and one (1) absence during the summer may lead to a need to withdraw from the course or negatively

impact your final grade.

- **Incomplete policy:** Incompletes are only granted in extreme cases such as illness or other family emergency and only where almost all work for the semester has been successfully completed and the basis for the Incomplete can be verified. A student's procrastination in completing his/her paper is not a basis for an Incomplete.

### **Tips for Reading, Class Discussion, & Position Papers:**

Here are some tips for the assigned readings and your position papers:<sup>1</sup>

- Some of the readings are descriptive, these are intended to provide context for thinking about a specific kind of threat. As you read these try to identify key facts or examples that you find puzzling and/or surprising.
- Some of the readings are theoretical, providing you with ways of thinking about the phenomena we are studying. Before approaching each theoretical reading think about the key questions from previous weeks and how that reading relates to things we covered in previous weeks. Then skim over the reading to get a sense of the themes it covers, and, before reading further, jot down what questions you hope the reading will be able to answer for you. Next, read the introduction and conclusion. This is normally enough to get a sense of the big picture. Ask yourself: Are the claims in the text surprising? Do you believe them? Can you think of examples of places that do not seem consistent with the logic of the argument? Is the reading answering the questions you hoped it would answer? If not, is it answering more or less interesting questions than you had thought of? Next ask yourself: What types of evidence or arguments would you need to see in order to be convinced of the results? Now read through the whole text, checking as you go through how the arguments used support the claims of the author.
- **For any reading you should keep notes as you read.** When you come across issues that you are not convinced by, write them down and bring them along to class for discussion. Also note when you are pleasantly surprised, when the author produced a convincing argument that you had not thought of.

### **Course Outline:**

#### **Session 1, September 7<sup>th</sup>: What is security?**

From Hobbes's Leviathan to the most recent declarations by international bodies, security is commonly regarded as the fundamental logic of social order. 'Security' proliferates as a modifier for a whole host of terms: food-security, energy-security, climate-security, etc. But what is security? How do we know that something is secure? What does it mean to establish a safe and secure environment? What is the minimum level of security required to feel "safe"? How do we establish a sense of security?

#### *Required reading:*

1. Rothschild, Emma. "What is Security?" *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (1995): 53-90.
2. Dillon, Michael. *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*. London: Routledge, 1996: 120-128.

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<sup>1</sup> These are taken from Marcatan Humphrey's syllabus for a graduate course on political violence.

3. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998: 21-48.
4. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. (2009) Security Sector Governance and Reform.
5. White House. Fact Sheet: US Security Assistance Policy:  
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>
6. UN High Commissioner, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, *Human suffering, moral blankness, and the ties of sentiment*. Speech presented to the Carnegie Council on 8 June 2015.
7. UN Secretary General (2013) Second Secretary-General's Report on SSR. "Securing states and societies." (A/67/970–S/2013/480).  
[http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2013\\_480.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_480.pdf)

*Additional reading:*

1. US National Security Strategy, 2015: 7-13
2. Wolfers, Arnold. "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952): 481-483.
3. UN Documents 60/180. The Peacebuilding Commission.
4. UN Documents Resolution 1645 (along w/ above establishes UN peace-building commission)
5. Report of the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations. "Uniting our Strengths for Peace" 16 June 2015  
[http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf)
6. Loader, Ian, and Neil Walker. *Civilizing Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. 234-264.
7. Williams, Michael C. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics" *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 511-531.
8. Abrahamsen, Rita and Michael C. Williams "Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics" *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 1 (2009): 1-17.

**Session 2, September 14<sup>th</sup>: What is development? What is good governance? What is the role of security and good governance in promoting development? What is the role of development in promoting security?**

'Development' is a highly plastic concept. It can refer to the natural ageing of a biological organism, the historical change of political institutions, society's growing technological complexity, as well as foreign actors executing certain kinds of projects. To understand modern security sector governance it is crucial to have a firm grasp on the assumptions, foundations and evolution of the Western development enterprise.

*Required reading:*

1. Dormandy, Xenia. "US Election Note: The Military vs. Development Aid":  
[http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0712usen\\_military.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0712usen_military.pdf) pp.1-7 (as you read think about what sorts of policies you think are most effective in making the world more secure)

2. Rist, Gilbert. *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*. New York: Zed Books, 2006: 8-24; 69-79.
3. Mazower, Mark. *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*. New York: Penguin Press, 2012: 273-304.
4. Jackson, P. (2015) "Ch.1: Introduction: security & development" in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
5. Schnabel, A. (2015) "Ch. 8: Security Sector Reform as a Manifestation of the Security-Development Nexus? Towards Building SSR Theory." in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Pp.115-34.
6. Runde, Daniel F. and Conor M. Savoy. "The Ecosystem of U.S. International Development Assistance: A Development and Foreign Policy Strategic Asset" Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012: <http://csis.org/publication/ecosystem-us-international-development-assistance> pp.1-22.

*Additional reading:*

1. 2015 QDDR. Chapter 1, pp. 17-49. [skim] <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241429.pdf>
2. UNDP. *Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience*. Chapters 1& 2, pp. 15-51. [skim] <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf>
3. Duffield, Mark. *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*, London: Polity Press, 2007: 1-31.
4. Moyo, Dambisa. *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa*. London: Allen Lane, 2009.
5. Overview and Chapter 3 and 5, *World Development Report*, World Bank (2011).
6. Willis, Katie. *Theories and Practices of Development*, Oxford: Routledge, 2011: 1-35.
7. Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
8. Rottenburg, Richard. *Far-fetched Facts: A Parable of Development Aid*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009

**Session 3, September 21<sup>st</sup>: Topic: What is the role of the state in providing security? How do you "build" states? Theories of state power and fragility**

The primary modern vehicle for the provision of security and development is the Westphalian state. While modern states derive their legitimacy from the provision of these goods to their populations, states also generate insecurity and contribute to underdevelopment. At its simplest, security sector governance uses targeted state-building initiatives to respond to circumstances characterized by weak, incompetent, or malicious states. This means that security sector governance has a theory of state power, and state formation, even if it is not made explicit.

*Required reading:*

1. Tilly, Charles. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985: 169-191.

2. Acemoglu, Daron and James A Robinson. Ch.13 “Why Nations Fail Today” in *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York: Crown Business, 2012.
3. Litwak, Robert S. *Outlier States: American Strategies to Change, Contain, or Engage Regimes*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012: 87-127.
4. Bremmer, Ian. *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006: 3-25.
5. O’Hanlon, Michael. “Obama’s Weak and Failing States Agenda” *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2012): 67-80.
6. Kuperman, A. (2015) Obama’s Libya Debacle. *Foreign Affairs*  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2015-02-16/obamas-libya-debacle>

*Additional reading:*

1. Scott, James. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998: 11-52.
2. Wilen, Nina. (2015) “Ch. 12: Security sector reform and liberal state building.” in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Pp.181-93.
3. Egnell, Robert, and Peter Haldén. "Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory." *Conflict, Security & Development* 9, no. 1 (2009): 27 - 54.
4. UNDP. *Governance Indicators: A Users’ Guide*. (pp. 1-14)  
[http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/oslo-governance-center/governance-assessments/governance-indicators-2nd-edition/governance\\_indicator\\_undp\\_users\\_guide\\_online\\_version.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/oslo-governance-center/governance-assessments/governance-indicators-2nd-edition/governance_indicator_undp_users_guide_online_version.pdf)
5. UNDP. *A User’s Guide to Measuring Fragility*:  
[http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/OGC/usersguide\\_measure\\_fragility\\_ogc.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/OGC/usersguide_measure_fragility_ogc.pdf)
6. Call, Charles. “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’” *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 8 (2008): 1491-1507.
7. Aldrich, Daniel P. *Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012: 1-23.
8. Brooks, Rosa Ehrenreich. “Failed States, or the State as Failure” *University of Chicago Law Review* 72, no 4 (2005): 1159-1196.
9. Fukuyama, Francis. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Profile Books, 2004: 1-57.

**Session 4, September 28<sup>th</sup>: Drivers of insecurity and instability & how to determine the quality of security sector governance**

Technological change, demography, economic incentives (illicit and legitimate), environmental factors, and political grievances all interact in global politics to produce both stability and instability. The questions of which particular configurations lead to human depredation is the subject of much academic inquiry and practitioner activity. In practice security sector governance is frequently forced to begin with a set of assumptions about the drivers of instability when designing interventions, yet these assumptions are usually not made available for debate

and possible refutation. What kind of factors should we include in security sector governance planning exercises? How do we measure the quality of security sector governance?

*Required reading:*

1. Gilman, Nils, Jesse Goldhammer and Steven Weber (eds.) (2011) *Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. New York: Continuum, 1-23; 270-286. (Introduction & Conclusion)
2. Acemoglu, Daron and James A Robinson. “Ch. 12: The Vicious Cycle” in *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York: Crown Business, 2012.
3. Call, Charles T. “Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives” *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2011): 303-326.
4. Collier, Paul. “The Market for Civil War” *Foreign Policy* (2003). <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/02/the-market-for-civil-war/>
5. Wimmer, A. (2013) “How the Nation-State Made Modern Conflict” *Foreign Affairs*.
6. Marten, K. (2012) *Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States*. Ch.1 Warlords: An Introduction pp.1-15. & Ch 2. Warlords and Universal Sovereignty pp. 20-30 & start reading rest of book (due next week).

*Additional reading:*

1. Schroeder, Ursula C. “Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators” Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). 2010. Pp.1-32. (*a bit dry but a good resource*)
2. Davis, Mike. *Planet of Slums*. New York: Verso, 2007: 1-19.
3. Collins, Randall. “Micro and Macro causes of Violence” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 3, no. 1 (2009): 9-22.
4. Fearon, James and David Laitin “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.
5. Schwartz, Peter. *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*. New York: Doubleday, 1996.
6. Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
7. National Intelligence Council (NIC). *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*. Washington DC: CIA – Imaging & Publishing Support, 2012: i-xiv.
8. Schoemaker, Paul J.H. “Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking” *Sloan Management Review* 36, no. 2 (1995): 25-40.

**Session 5, October 5<sup>th</sup>: Warlords, outsourcing, and weak states: case studies and lessons learned**

In order to understand what sorts of measures might be most effective in promoting state-building and security sector reform, it is imperative to understand why those entities that challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force exist either in opposition to or collusion with the institutions of the state. Using case studies from Marten’s book, we will explore different configurations of “warlordism” with a view to inform efforts to undermine their authority and re-establish the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

*Required reading:*

1. Marten, K. (2012) Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States. Pp. 31-200.

*Additional reading:*

1. Felbab- Brown, V. (2015) “The dubious joy of standing up militias and building partner capacity: lessons from Afghanistan and Mexico for prosecuting security policy through proxies” Brookings.

**\*\*\* In-class debate on whether external actors should work with irregular force in stabilization/security sector governance endeavors\*\*\***

**Session 6, October 12<sup>th</sup>: Intervention, stabilization, & reconstruction: actors & themes**

Pervasive instability—as both constructed image and material fact—has contributed to the formation of a stabilization and reconstruction complex. Intervention, stabilization and reconstruction actors can be arranged according to sets of couplets: security/development, public/private, field/headquarters, and local/international. Actors engaged in stabilization and reconstruction efforts are frequently organized into a development coalition (UNDP, ICRC, Oxfam, Landmine Action) separated from a security formation (DPKO, DoD, DynCorp International, etc.). A further important theme to help conceptualize stabilization and reconstruction efforts is the curious interaction of private and public interests. Private companies receive government or international organization contracts to help assist a weak or failing state. Yet these companies can be important actors in and of themselves, fundamentally shaping realities on the ground. Moreover, all foreign intervention efforts have to mediate the relationship between field and headquarters in their own manner. In addition to these various international actors, there is also a plethora of local actors and security institutions on the ground (often an alphabet soup of civil society representatives, factions, militias, and sub-state armed groups), each representing different interests and often seeking to maximize different values (wealth, power, etc.).

*Required reading:*

1. Bellamy, Alex (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention” *International Affairs* 84, no. 4: 615-639.
2. Weiss, T. (2014) “Military Humanitarianism: Syria Hasn’t Killed It.” *The Washington Quarterly* 37(1): 7-20.
3. Pattison, James. “Outsourcing the responsibility to protect: humanitarian intervention and private military and security companies” *International Theory* 2, no. 1 (2010): 1-31.
4. Bachmann, Jan. (2014) Policing Africa: The US military and visions of crafting ‘good order’ *Security Dialogue* 45(2): 119-46.
5. MacGinty, Roger. “Against Stabilization” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 1, no. 1 (2012): 20-30.
6. Lemay-Hébert, J. (2014) “Resistance in the Time of Cholera: The Limits of Stabilization Through Securitization in Haiti.” *International Peacekeeping* 21(2): 198-213.
7. Dobbins, James. (2004) “The UN’s Role in Nation Building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq” *Survival* 46, no. 4: 81-102.

*Additional reading:*

1. FM 3-07. (2014) *Stability Operations*. Chapter 1: Stability Tasks in Military Operations. [http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/fm3\\_07\(1\).pdf](http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/fm3_07(1).pdf)
2. Dhungana, S. (2007) "Security Sector Reform & Peacebuilding in Nepal: A Critical Reflection." *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 3(2): 70-8.
3. Ebo, A. (2007) "Non-State Actors, Peacebuilding, & Security Governance in West Africa: Beyond Commercialization." *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 3(2): 53-69.
4. Denney, L. (2014) "Overcoming the State/Non-State Divide: An End User Approach to Security and Justice Reform." *International Peacekeeping* 21(2): 251-68.
5. Muggah, R. & Zyck, S. (2015) "Ch. 20: Stabilizing fragile states" in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
6. Albrecht, P. & Stepputat, F. (2015) "Ch 10: The rise and fall of security sector reform in development." in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
7. Bellamy, A.J. (2015) Responsibility to Protect Turns 10. *Ethics and International Affairs*. 29(2): 161-85.
8. NATO. *Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO's involvement in stabilization and reconstruction*. September, 2011.
9. Allred, Keith J. "Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It" *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 1 (2006): 5-23.
10. Rosén, Frederik. "Off the record: outsourcing security and state building to private firms and the question of record keeping, archives, and collective memory" *Archival Science* 8 (2008): 1-14.
11. Barnett, Michael "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War" *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 87-112.
12. Rieff, David. *A Bed for a Night, Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.
13. Autesserre, Séverine. "Hobbes and the Congo: Frames Local Violence, and International Intervention" *International Organization* 63, no 2 (2009): 249-280.

**\*\*\* Policy Memo Proposals Due \*\*\***

**Session 7, October 19<sup>th</sup>: Security sector reform & the rule of law: external actors in weak and/or developing states**

Law is often understood as generated from national traditions and local social practices. But, in circumstances of external Security Sector Governance assistance, laws are frequently written for countries by or with external actors. In this sense domestic law, can be seen as a product of the international. The question—whether these laws are vigorously applied or slumber in the books—remains. At the same time, the legitimacy of stabilization and reconstruction efforts as well as the reform of the security sector is itself predicated on a particular conception of the rule of law and authorization. How do rule of law initiatives contribute to security and development? Is security predicated on legality?

*Required reading:*

1. Carothers, Thomas. "The Rule of Law Revival" *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 2 (1998), pp. 1-7.
2. Sannerholm, Richard Zajac. "Looking Back, Moving Forward: UN Peace Operations and Rule of Law Assistance in Africa, 1989-2010" *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 4, No. 2 (2012): 359-373.
3. OHCHR, *Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Mapping the justice sector* (2006).
4. Marten, K. (2014) "Reformed or Deformed? Patronage Politics, International Influence, and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces." *International Peacekeeping* 21(2): 181-97.
5. Magaloni, B. & Diaz-Cayeros, A. "Democratic Accountability and the Rule of Law in Mexico." MacMillan Center, Yale University.
6. Hills, A. (2014) "Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia." *International Peacekeeping* 21(2): 165-80.
7. Hill, R. et al. (2007) "Building Security Where There is No Security." *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 3(2): 38-52.

*Additional reading:*

1. *Draft Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the 67<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels.* September, 2012.
2. Sedra, M. (2011) "Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East." United States Institute of Peace, pp. 1- 14.
3. Botero, Juan Carlos, Robert L. Nelson and Christine Pratt "Indices and Indicators of Justice, Governance, and the Rule of Law: An Overview" *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 3, No. 2 (2011): 153-169.
4. Beswick, D. (2015) "Ch. 25: Military Forces in Contemporary Development" in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development.* Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
5. Isima, J. (2007) "The Privatization of Violence and Security Sector Reform in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa Examined." *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 3(2): 24-37.
6. Kleinfeld, Rachel. *Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform.* Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.
7. Davis, Kevin E., Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry "Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance" *Law & Society Review* 46, No. 1 (2012): 71-104.
8. Maru, Vivek. "Between Law and Society: Paralegals and the Provision of Justice Services in Sierra Leone and Worldwide" *The Yale Journal of International Law* 31, (2006): 427-476.
9. Orford, Anne. *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011: 1-41.
10. May, Christopher. "The Rule of Law: Athenian Antecedents to Contemporary Debates" *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 4, No. 2 (2012): 235-251.

**Session 8, October 26<sup>th</sup>: Security sector reform & the rule of law: internal reform in developed democracies**

Even developed democracies suffer from security governance problems and challenges regarding the rule of law. What are the sources of such problems? How might they contribute to conflict? What changes in security governance institutions promote the rule of law? What lessons can be

learned for the implementation of the rule of law and the creation of security governance institutions in weak or failing states?

*Required reading:*

1. Ellison, G. (2007) “A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World?: Police Reform, Political Transition, and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland.” *Police Quarterly* 10(3): 243-69.
  - For those who require background info. on the conflict in Northern Ireland: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles> (otherwise, skip)
2. Knox, C. (2002) “See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Insidious Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland.” *British Journal of Criminology* 42:164-85.
3. Northern Ireland Life and Times Research Update #13 “Police and the youth vote”
4. Marijan, B. & Brennan, S. (2014) “Policing the Past and Present in Northern Ireland.” <http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/09/18/policing-the-past-and-present-in-northern-ireland/>
5. Innes, M. (2006) “Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror Through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*
6. Weitzer, R. (2015) “American Policing Under Fire: Misconduct and Reform.” *Society* 52:475-80.
7. Coates, T. (2015) “The Myth of Police Reform” *The Atlantic*. <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-myth-of-police-reform/390057/>

*Additional reading:*

1. Ellison, G. & O’Rawe, M. (2010) “Security governance in transition: the compartmentalizing, corralling, and crowding out of policing and security in Northern Ireland.” 14(1).
2. Ellison, G. & O’Reilly (2008) “‘Ulster’s Policing Goes Global’: The police reform process in Northern Ireland and the creation of a global brand.” *Crime, Law, and Social Change* 50:331-51
3. Report of the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland. (1999) A New Beginning Policing in Northern Ireland. <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf>, p. 1-122.
4. Smyth, M. (2004) “The process of demilitarization and the reversibility of the peace process in Northern Ireland.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*
5. Statement of the United States of America On the Occasion of the 67<sup>th</sup> Session UN General Assembly’s Rule of Law High Level Meeting. September, 2012. <http://unrol.org/files/Pledges%20by%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America.pdf>

**Session 9, November 2<sup>nd</sup>: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

How does one eliminate armed groups of individuals once they have been constituted under circumstances of insecurity? This is the central challenge DDR programs address—whose formal existence can be traced to 1989. In pursuit of that objective a host of minor sub-problems arise: how do you identify and sort the individuals to be demobilized? Is there any way to disarm groups in a society without paying them or providing other incentives, such as educational

programs? Is it *right* for the international community to financially reward individuals for having partaken in violent conflict? Finally, what do we do with the people who have been disarmed and demobilized? Falling under the label of “reintegration” this component of DDR brings with it the most unknowns and difficulties.

*Required reading:*

1. Campbell, Alec. (2003) “Where do all the Soldiers Go?: Veterans and the Politics of Demobilization” in Davis, Diane E. and Anthony W. Pereira (eds.) *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 96-117.
2. Muggah, R. & O’Donnell, C. (2015) “Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.” <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.fs/>
3. Felbab-Brown, V. (2015) “Ch.5. DDR- A Bridge Not Too Far: A Field Report from Somalia” in *UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for a Purpose?* pp. 104-59
4. Knight, Mark and Alpaslan Özerdem “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 4 (2004): 499-516.
5. Spear, Joanna. “From Political Economies of War to Political Economies of Peace: The Contribution of DDR after Wars of Predation” *Contemporary Security Policy* 27, no. 1 (2006): 168-189.
6. Annan, J. et al. (2011) “Civil war, reintegration, and gender in Northern Uganda.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*
7. Weinstein, Jeremy M. and Macartan Humphreys. “Disentangling the Determinants for Successful Demobilization and Reintegration” *Center for Global Development*. Working Paper Number 69. (2005).  
[http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/4155\\_file\\_WP\\_69\\_0.pdf](http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/4155_file_WP_69_0.pdf)
8. Dwyer, C. (2012) “Expanding DDR: The transformative role of former prisoners in community based reintegration in Northern Ireland.” *International Journal of Transitional Justice*

*Additional reading:*

1. Cockayne, J. & O’Neil, S. “Conclusion: Making DDR Fit for a Purpose in an Era of Violent Extremism.” in *UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for a Purpose?*
2. United Nations. [\*Second Generation DDR Practices\*](#). 2010.
3. United Nations. [\*DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective\*](#). 2010.
4. Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo” *African Security* 2, no 1 (2009): 29-58.
5. Ball, Nicole. “Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration” *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (SIDDR) (2005).
6. Wagle, G.S. & Jackson, P. (2015) “Ch. 26: Lessons from peace processes: the case of Nepal.” in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

7. Ozerdem, A. (2015) “Ch 27: Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants and development with a specific reference to the Taliban in Afghanistan.” in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
8. A community dilemma: DDR and the changing face of violence in Columbia.  
[http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20110700\\_briscoe\\_derks\\_colombia.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf)

**Session 10, November 9<sup>th</sup> (Please note we will need to make up this class as I will be out of town at a conference): The importance of consent and critiques of SSR; organizational mindsets & staffing**

This class discusses the importance of consent in security sector assistance and reform. With local consent what is hard to do is possible, without it what should be easy to do is impossible. Consent is not the same as local ownership and it can be engendered. We also will cover organizational problems experienced in the field and back at home. While bureaucratic norms and particular professional cultures play a significant role in framing and structuring security and development programs, individuals still matter in institutions. Therefore, what kind of people should be recruited for security sector governance projects as well as a reformed security sector in a post-conflict country?

*Required reading:*

1. Berg, Jessica W. et al. (2011) *Informed Consent: legal theory and clinical practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-13. *This is a theoretical reading, but I promise will be relevant!*
2. Sedra, Mark (2014). “Ch.11: Transitioning from first to second generation security sector reform in conflict-affected countries.” in Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
3. Schroeder, U., Chappuis, F., & Kocak, D. (2014) “Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance.” *International Peacekeeping* 21(2): 214-30.
4. Whalan, Jeni. “The Power of Friends: The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 6 (2010): 627-637.
5. Touko Piipari, (2007) “A Clash of Mindsets? An Insiders Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 143-157.
6. Rumin, Serge. “Gathering and Managing Information in Vetting Processes” in Mayer-Rieckh, Alexander and Pablo De Greiff (eds.) *Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies*. New York: Social Science Research Council, 2007: 402-447.
7. Ricks, Thomas. (2012) “What Ever Happened to Accountability?” *Harvard Business Review* 90(10): 93-100.

*Additional reading:*

1. Lister, Matthew “The Legitimizing Role of Consent in International Law” *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Vol. 11 (2011): 663-691.
2. Alan Doss, “Eyewitness: Crisis, Contention and Coherence – Reflections from the Field,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2008), pp. 570-581.
3. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services. Audit Report: [“The ‘Inspira’ Talent Management Project at the United Nations Secretariat.”](#) (2011).

4. Sinoway, Eric S. [“When to Fire a Top Performer Who Hurts Your Company Culture”](#) Harvard Business Review Blog (2012).
5. Taylor, Bill. [“Hire Superstar Talent Fast”](#) Harvard Business Review Blog (2011).

### **Session 11, November 16<sup>th</sup>: Case study – Liberia**

How much did Liberia’s peculiar history determine its Civil War and post-conflict reconstruction? Liberia has a curious historical relationship with the US. Bearing this in mind, as one of the primary drivers for local consent, to what extent can Security Sector Governance in Liberia *at all* generate lessons learned applicable to other cases?

#### *Required reading:*

1. Ellis, Stephen. *The Mask of Anarchy: the destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of an African civil war*. London: Hurst, 1999: 110-141.
2. Reno, William. “Anti-corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are they Aimed at the Right Targets?” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3 (2008): 387-404.
3. Jennings, Kathleen M. “The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia” *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 2 (2007): 204-218.
4. Ansorge, Josef and Nana Akua Antwi-Ansorge “Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force: DDR-SSR Liberia” in Miklaucik, Michael (ed.) *Monopoly of Force* Washington DC: NDU Press 2011: 265-284.
5. Jaye, Thomas. “Liberia: Parliamentary Oversight and Lessons Learned from Internationalized Security Sector Reform” pp.1-19  
[http://www.apcof.org/files/3116\\_Liberia\\_SSR.pdf](http://www.apcof.org/files/3116_Liberia_SSR.pdf)
6. Basedau, M. Mehler, A., & Smith-Hoegn, J. (2007) “Public Perceptions of Security In Post-Conflict Liberia & Sierra Leone” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*. Pp. 84-9.
7. Hudson, Heidi. (2014) “Ch. 4: Untangling the gendering of the security-development nexus.” In Jackson, P. (ed.) *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
8. International Crisis Group. “Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform” Africa Report no. 148 (2009). [skim]

#### *Additional reading:*

1. Jaye, Thomas. “Liberia’s Security Sector Legislation” DCAF.
2. [ABC Nightline Report on Liberia’s NPFL War](#) (June 1990).
3. Al-Jazeera English Inside Story on Charles Taylor (June 2007) [Part 1](#); [Part 2](#).
4. Reno, William. “The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Absence of State-Building in West Africa” in Davis, Diane E. and Anthony W. Pereira (eds.) *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 322-345.
5. Malan, Mark. [“Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings”](#) *Strategic Studies Institute* (2008).

### **Session 12, November 30<sup>th</sup>: Case studies – Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina**

Kosovo is a relatively new country with a narrative that stretches into the Middle Ages. Like Liberia, Kosovo is marked by a very strong, pro-American and international intervention

attitude. The question remains whether this particular configuration lends itself to application to other, less permissive, environments.

*Required reading:*

1. Gray, Christine. *International Law and the Use of Force*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000: 24-50.
2. Bellamy, A. J. "Kosovo and the Advent of Sovereignty as Responsibility", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no. 2, (2009): 163-184.
3. David L. Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*. Cambridge: The MIT Press 2012: 115-156.
4. Matthew Brunwasser, "The Crush at Kosovo's Business Door? The Return of U.S. Heros" *New York Times* (Dec 11, 2012).  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/europe/americans-who-helped-free-kosovo-return-as-entrepreneurs.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/europe/americans-who-helped-free-kosovo-return-as-entrepreneurs.html?_r=0)
5. Dennis MacShane, *Why Kosovo Still Matters*, (London, House Publishing, 2011), pp. 86-108.
6. Berg, L. (2014) "From Weakness to Strength: The Political Roots of Security Sector Reform in Bosnia & Herzegovina." *International Peacekeeping* 21(2): 149-64.
7. Hopkins, V. (2015) "In the Shadow of Genocide." *Foreign Policy*.  
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/in-the-shadow-of-genocide-srebrenica-bosnia/>

*Additional reading:*

1. Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: A Short History*. New York: MacMillan 1998.
2. Muelhmann, T. (2008) "Police restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems of internally led security sector reform." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2(1).
3. Shapiro, Ari. (2015) "After Kosovo emerged from war, foreign extremists radicalized youth." NPR. <http://www.npr.org/2015/06/24/417192078/after-kosovo-emerged-from-war-foreign-extremists-radicalized-youth>

**Session 13, December 7<sup>th</sup>: Case studies – Afghanistan & Iraq**

Afghanistan and Iraq are sites of complex concurrent security governance issues and efforts by the United States and international community to reform the security sector in these countries "under fire" have fallen short of their goals. How does the counterinsurgency (COIN) logic visible in Afghanistan and Iraq fit into the broader themes of security sector governance (SSG) sketched up until this point—or rather, vice versa, how does SSG fit into COIN? Could better security sector governance in Iraq have prevented the rise of ISIS? What sorts of reforms and policies in Afghanistan would be most effective at containing the Taliban?

*Required reading:*

1. Tadjbakhsh, Sharhbanou and Michael Schoiswohl, "Playing With Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan", *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 2, (2008): 252-267.
2. Jonathan Goodhand, "Corrupting or Consolidating Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2008), pp. 405-423.

3. Sedra, Mark. "Afghanistan and the Folly of Apolitical Demilitarization", *Conflict, Security & Development* 11, no. 4 (2011): 473-496.
4. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) (2015) "Rule of Law in Afghanistan: US Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs Costing More Than \$1 Billion." Executive Summary (1<sup>st</sup> 2 pages).
5. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) (2016) 31<sup>st</sup> Quarterly Report to the US Congress. Read Ch.1 "Security: The Eroding Bedrock" pp.1-18 have a quick glance at rest of report
6. RAND. (2005) "Chapter 4: Evaluating Security Sector Reform in Iraq." Pp.73-91
7. Gates, R. (2010) The Future of US Security Assistance. *Foreign Affairs* 89(3):2-6

*Additional reading:*

1. International Crisis Group. "[Reforming Afghanistan's Broken Judiciary.](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx)" Asia Report No. 195 (2010). Pp. 1-31.  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx>
2. International Crisis Group. "[A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army.](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx)" Asia Report No. 190 (2010). Pp.1-27.  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx>
3. International Crisis Group. "The Future of the Afghan Local Police" July 2015.  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-local-police.pdf> Ali Jalali, Rebuilding Afghanistan's National Army.  
<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/02autumn/jalali.pdf>
4. Sedra, M. (2002) *Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*.
5. Wimmer, A. and C. Schetter (2002) *State Building First: Recommendations for Reconstruction and Peace-Making in Afghanistan*. Bonn: Center for Development Research, University of Bonn.
6. Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO's involvement in stabilization and reconstruction. September, 2011.
7. Shahrani, Nazif. "War, factionalism, and the state in Afghanistan," *American Anthropologist* 104, 3 (2002): 715-22.
8. Killcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. London: Hurst & Company: 2009.
9. Aikins, Matthieu. "[Contracting the Commanders: Transition and the Political Economy of Afghanistan's Private Security Industry](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx)" NYU: Center on International Cooperation (2012).
10. ICG Report: *The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils*.  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/The%20Afghan%20Transitional%20Administration%20Prospects%20and%20Perils.pdf>
11. ICG Report: *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*. Pp. 1-25.
12. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-local-police.pdf>

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**Session 14, December 14<sup>th</sup>: The future of SSG and rule of law: lessons learned and ways forward**

**\*\*\* Policy Memos Due and In-Class Presentations\*\*\***